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Abstract 
In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other 
QHXURORJLFDO µGLVRUGHUV¶ GLDJQRVHG E\ EHKDYLRXUDO LQGLFDWRUV DQG WKHRULVHG SULPDULO\
within the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. Such cognitive-
behavioural discourses abstain from acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and 
interaction in the formation of a contested and constantly reconstructed social reality, 
SURGXFHGWKURXJKWKHDJHQF\RILWVµDFWRUV¶*DUILQNHO7Ke nature of these contested 
interactions will be explored in this current issues piece through the use of the term the 
µGRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHP¶0LOWRQD), and how such a rendition produces a critique of 
DXWLVPEHLQJGHILQHGDVDGHILFLWLQµWKHRU\RIPLQG¶, re-framing such issues as a question of 




Socrates: ...Can you point out any compelling rhetorical reason why he should have put his 
arguments together in the order that he has? 
Phaedrus: You do me too much honour if you suppose that I am capable of divining his 
motives so exactly. (Plato, 1973: 78). 
In recent decades there has been much debate over the ontological status of autism and other 
QHXURORJLFDOµGLVRUGHUV¶GLDJQRVHGE\EHKDYLRXUDOLQGLFDWRUVDQGWKHRULVHGSULPDULO\ZLWKLQ
the field of cognitive neuroscience and psychological paradigms. The triad of dominant 
theories that include: theory of mind deficit, executive dysfunction, and weak central  
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coherence theory, as well as behavioural diagnosis and behavioural psychological 
intervention paradigms; all position autism as a neurological disorder, a pathological 
deviance from expected functional stages of development. This approach when applied to the 
HGXFDWLRQ RI WKRVH GLDJQRVHG EHFRPHV D µWUHDWPHQW SURJUDP¶ RI PRGLI\LQJ WKH µautistic 
person¶ DV µEHVW RQH FDQ¶ WR ILW LQ ZLWK WKH PDLQVWUHDP FXOWXUH RI VRFLHW\ 6XFK YLHZV DUH
informed by research that champions the use of the randomised controlled trial, yet discounts 
the subjective experiences of those who identify as being on the autism spectrum themselves 
as worthy of rigorous academic study. Such cognitive-behavioural discourses abstain from 
acknowledging the universal issue of relationality and interaction in the formation of a 
contested and constantly reconstructed social reality, produced through the agency of its 
µDFWRUV¶ 7KH QDWXUH RI WKHVH FRQWHVWHG LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLOO EH H[SORUHG LQ WKLV current issues 
piece WKURXJK WKH XVH RI WKH WHUP WKH µGRXEOH HPSDWK\ SUREOHP¶ 0LOWRQ D), and how 
such a rendition produces a critique of auWLVPEHLQJGHILQHGDVDGHILFLWLQµWKHRU\RIPLQG¶
and social interaction, re-framing such issues as a question of reciprocity and mutuality. 
Assumptions of social relationality 
7KHLQDELOLW\WRµUHDG¶WKHVXEWH[WRIDVRFLDOVLWXDWLRQLVRIWHQGHHPHGWREHDPDMRUIHDWXUH
of those diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum, yet it is suggested here that social 
subtext is never fully given as a set of a priori circumstances, but is actively constructed by 
social agents engaged in material and mental production.  There is a tendency in the 
application of positivist methodologies in cognitive psychology and science to incorrectly 
assume that there is a set of definable social norms and rules that exist for people to follow. 
This ideology is also supported more explicitly by functionalist sociologists. This is not the 
philosophy propounded by those of a phenomenological or ethnomethodological persuasion 
KRZHYHU7KHµWKHRU\RIPLQG¶DQG µHPSDWK\¶VRODXGHGLQQRUPDWLYHSV\FKRORJLFDOPRGHOV
RI KXPDQ LQWHUDFWLRQ UHIHUV WR WKH DELOLW\ D µQHXUR-W\SLFDO¶ 17 LQGLYLGXDO KDV WR DVVXPH
XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI WKH PHQWDO VWDWHV DQG PRWLYHV RI RWKHU SHRSOH :KHQ VXFK µHPSDWK\¶ LV
applied toward an µautistic person¶ however, it is often wildly inaccurate in its measure. Such 
attempts are often felt as invasive, imposing and threatening by an µautistic person¶, 
HVSHFLDOO\ZKHQSURWHVWDWLRQVWRWKHFRQWUDU\DUHLJQRUHGE\WKH17GRLQJWKHµHPSDWKLVLQJ¶ 
TKHµGRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHP¶$GLVMXQFWXUHLQUHFLSURFLW\EHWZHHQWZRGLIIHUHQWO\GLVSRVHG
social actors which becomes more marked the wider the disjuncture in dispositional 
perceptions of the lifeworld - perceived as a breach in the 'natural attitude' of what 
FRQVWLWXWHV
VRFLDOUHDOLW\
IRUµQHXro-W\SLFDO¶SHRSOHDQG\HWDQHYHU\GD\DQG often traumatic 
experience for µautistic people¶.  
7RH[SDQGRQ WKHDERYHGHILQLWLRQ WKH µGRXEOHHPSDWK\SUREOHP¶UHIHUV WRDEUHDFK LQ WKH
µQDWXUDODWWLWXGH¶WKDWRFFXUVEHWZHHQSHRSOHRIGLIIHUHQWGLVSRVLWLRQDORXWORRNVDQGSHUVRQDO
conceptual understandings when attempts are made to communicate meaning. In a sense it is 
a 'double problem' as both people experience it, and so it is not a singular problem located in 
any one person. Rather, it is based in the social interaction between two differently disposed 
social actors, the disjuncture being more severe for the non-autistic disposition as it is 
experienced as unusual, while for the µautistic person¶ it is a common experience (Milton, 
2011b). 7KH µHPSDWK\¶ SUREOHP EHLQJ D µWZR-ZD\ VWUHHW¶ KDV EHHQ PHQWLRQHG E\ ERWK
µautistic writers¶ (Sinclair, 1993) and NT writers alike (Hacking, 2009), yet despite such 
proWHVWDWLRQVWKHµODFNRIWKHRU\RIPLQG¶P\WKSHUVLVWV. 
7KHVWLJPDRIEHLQJµRWKHUHG¶DQGWKHQRUPDOLVDWLRQDJHQGD 
To be defined as abnormal is potentially to be seen as 'pathological' in some way and to be 
socially stigmatised, shunned, and sanctioned. Then if there is a breakdown in interaction, or 
indeed a failed attempt to impose upon or align toward expressions of meaning, than a person 
who sees their interactions as 'normal' and 'correct' can denigrate those who act or are 
SHUFHLYHGRIDVµGLIIHUHQW¶7DMIHODQG7XUQHU,IRQHFDQDSSO\D ODEHORQWKHµRWKHU¶
locating the problem in them, it also resolves WKHDSSOLHURI WKH ODEHO¶V µQDWXUDODWWLWXGH¶RI
responsibility in their own perceptions and the breach is healed perceptually, but not for the 
person who has been 'othered' (Said, 1978). 
Internalised oppression and psycho-emotional disablement 
7KHLPSRVLWLRQRIRQH¶VYLHZVXSRQDQRWKHUDQG WKHVXEVHTXHQW LQWHUQDOLVDWLRQRI this view 
can be seen to be a form of internalised oppression, where the negative connotations of the 
normative model of pathological difference becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (Becker, 
1963), leading to a self-imposed psycho-emotional disablement (Reeve, 2011). For those who 
resist such self-identifications and DWWHPSWV WR QRUPDOLVH KRZHYHU µZHOO LQWHQWLRQHG¶, are 
experienced as an 'invasion' of the µautistic¶ µOLIHZRUOG¶E\SHRSOHZDQWLQJ WRPRGLI\RQH¶V
EHKDYLRXUWRVXLWWKHLUSXUSRVHVDQGQRWRQH¶VRZQ(Milton and Lm, 2012). 
Autism and knowledge production 
Although compared to many categorisations of disability, autism has attained a great deal 
more public attention and that one could say that the label has become a fetishised 
commodity and even a global industry (Mallet, 2011), yet it is an industry that silences the 
autistic voice from any participation, other than in the form of a tokenistic gesture. Therefore, 
IDU IURP RZQLQJ WKH PHDQV RI PHQWDO SURGXFWLRQ DERXW RQH¶V RZQ FXOWXUH WKH µautistic 
individual¶ becomes the 'product' of the industry, the 'thing' that is 'intervened' with. 'Services' 
are provided for the carer's of µautistic people¶ with often little attention given to the needs of 
the µautistic person¶ as they perceive them to be. Autism is QRWMXVWDQµLQYLVLEOHGLVDELOLW\¶WR
many in terms of a behavioural definition, the µautistic voice¶ LVPDGHµLQYLVLEOH¶ZLWKLQWKH
current culture of how knowledge produced about µautistic people¶ often excludes 
empowered µautistic advocates¶ from such processes. 
Implications for service providers 
There is a spectrum in theory and practice more generally regarding service provision for 
µautistic people¶, between at one end those adhering to techniques of behavioural 
modification, so that children are socialised into what are deemed appropriate behaviours of 
socially functional future roles.  At the other extreme of this spectrum is an ethos of 
interactive mutuality concerned with the empowerment of individuals and communities, and 
where domLQDQFHDQGLPSRVLWLRQRIDXWKRULW\LVVHHQDVµG\VIXQFWLRQDO¶ Expressions of these 
extremes could be said to be found more frequently in discourses regarding best educational 
practice for µautistic people¶, ranging from the efforts of the Lovaas model of Applied 
Behavioural Analysis, through to child-focused and democratic educational ideological 
preferences. These narratives and practices can be said to be embedded within the wider 
discursive debate that exists between the medical and social models of disability as played 
out in the field of autism. It is the view of this author that there is an increasing complacency 
around the idea that lead professionals and practitioners have a good understanding of what 
'good autism practice' entails, for me this is an ongoing imperfect process of interaction and 
should never be seen as a given. 
Conclusion 
The lack of 'social insight' seen to be manifested in the actions of µautistic people¶ is both 
biologically and socially derived, and yet is also historically and culturally situated in 
discourse. The experience of a lack of realisation or the lack of insight is a very common one 
in social interactions of many varieties however, and leads to the µdouble empathy problem¶ 
between differently disposed social actors. Such divergences of perception are inevitable to a 
greater or lesser extent. So it is true that autistic people often lack insight about NT 
perceptions and culture, yet it is equally the case that NT people lack insight into the minds 
and culture of µautistic people¶, or that they may lack social insight in other social situations 
due to an easily repaired natural attitude, and the aligning tendencies of their peers. One 
could say that many autistic people have indeed gained a greater level of insight into NT 
society and mores than vice versa, perhaps due to the need to survive and potentially thrive in 
a NT culture. Conversely, the NT person has no pertinent personal requirement to understand 
the mind of the µautistic person¶ unless closely related socially in some way. 
In analysing the interactions that µautistic people¶ have with the wider population, it is easy to 
problematise the definitLRQRIDXWLVPDVDµVRFLDOGHILFLW¶ORFDWHGZLWKLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPLQG
'LIIHUHQFHVLQQHXURORJ\PD\ZHOOSURGXFHGLIIHUHQFHVLQVRFLDOLW\EXWQRWDµVRFLDOGHILFLW¶
as compared to an idealised normative view of social reality. Such definitions may help to 
signpost disability support services, but they are no way of defining autism in any kind of 
holistic sense. 
6RFUDWHV%XWVXSSRVHWKHZRUGVXVHGDUHµMXVW¶DQGµJRRG¶'RQ¶WZHWKHQJRHDFKKLVRZQ
way, and find ourselves in disagreement with ourselves as well as with each other? 
Phaedrus: Undoubtedly. (Plato, 1973: 77). 
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